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The last few years have brought particularly significant
transformations in the interplay between society and adolescents.
On the one hand, the law is increasingly recognizing the key
neurological and psychosocial differences between adults and
adolescents. As the Supreme Court has concluded in a string of
recent cases: there are certain "self-evident" and "universal"
differences between children and adults confirmed by both
science and common sense.' On the other hand, young people
are increasingly asserting their independence, whether through
the use of new technologies or in medical decisions, and are
demanding a voice in matters that concern them.2
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A.
Harvard University. I would like to thank Aliza Kaplan, Karen Porter, and
Jayne Ressler for their helpful comments, as well as Sam Chetrit for her
excellent research assistance. Lastly, I want to thank the Journal of Law and
Policy staff for its very able editing.
' J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403-04 (2011)
(referencing the long common law history of differentiating between minors
and adults); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)
(confirming differences between juveniles and adults in finding life without
parole to be an unconstitutional punishment for juveniles charged with non-
homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-73 (2005) (finding
the death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles based upon their immaturity
and differences from adults including greater vulnerability to peer pressure).
For an earlier recognition of this truth, see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
635 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("[Youth] often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to [make the right choices].").
2 See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Black? White? Asian? More Young Americans
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An initial question is: What exactly is an adolescent?
Definitions vary but are uniformly vague: Black's Law
Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines "adolescence" as "[t]hat age
which follows puberty and precedes the age of majority."' Other
definitions are similarly unhelpful: "Of, relating to, or
undergoing adolescence (i.e. . . . 1. The period of physical and
psychological development from the onset of puberty to
maturity. 2. A transitional period of development between youth
and maturity: the adolescence of a nation)o; or, "a young
person who is developing from a child into an adult e.g.
adolescents between the ages of 13 and 18 and the problems
they face."' The term adolescent is often used synonymously
with teenager, but arguably also includes those aged ten to
twelve, or "tweens," and those aged eighteen to twenty-one, the
latter being adults for some purposes. The definition depends
upon whether one is using the term to refer to cultural,
physiological, or neurological maturity. Cultural maturity-
engaging in typically adolescent behaviors such as seeking
independence from parents and prioritizing socializing with
Choose All of the Above, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2011, at Al (outlining how
young people are refusing to be defined along color lines or to submit to the
racial classifications drawn by prior generations); Joey Peters, Young Climate
Activists Push Obama, Vow to Create More Local Awareness, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/04/18/18climatewire-
young-climate-activists-push-obama-vow-to-cr-82293.html (discussing the
leadership of young people in revitalizing grassroots movements).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990).
' THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 23
(4th ed. 2000).
' OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 170 (2d ed. 1989).
6 See, e.g., Act of July 17, 1984, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (treating
persons under age twenty-one as adolescents for the purpose of consuming
alcohol); Preteens and Teens Still Need Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/who/teens/ (last
updated Aug. 25, 2011) (grouping teens and tweens in the "adolescents"
category for vaccine scheduling). Neurological and psychosocial research
indicates that impulse control and other brain functions are not fully mature
until the mid-twenties. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong
Direction: Science, Teenagers, and the Sting to "the Age of Consent," 20
J.L. & POL'Y 63 (2011) (outlining this research).
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peers'-and physiological maturity are beginning to occur
younger, whereas the latest research shows that neurological
maturity may not be complete until the mid-twenties. Under any
definition, adolescents comprise a significant number of
Americans: as of 2010, there were 40,979,000 ten- to nineteen-
year-olds (and 21,154,000 more twenty- to twenty-four-year-
olds), comprising 13.5 to 20.5 percent of the population.
Over the last half-century, adolescents have increasingly been
seen as a unique demographic group with their own culture,
strengths, and needs.'o Yet the law recognizes only two categories:
childhood and adulthood." And with a foot in each class,
adolescents have claims to be both excused from and held
responsible for their actions. The law has responded to this
confusion by being, in a word, confusing. The legal status of
adolescents has been variable and often inconsistent; adolescents
are treated as mature adults for some purposes and as incompetent
minors for others.12 This area of law has never been more in flux. 3
' These examples are manifestations of cultural maturity in American
society. As the name suggests, signifiers of cultural maturity will vary
according to societal norms.
8 Although cultural maturity begins earlier, it also continues later, with
more young people in their mid-twenties remaining financially dependent on
their parents, often even living in their childhood homes. See, e.g., Jennifer
Rosato, Essay, What Are the Implications of Roper's Dilemma for Adolescent
Health Law?, 20 J.L. & POL'Y 167 (2011) (discussing this trend).
9 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, ANNUAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT TABLE 1 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/age/age-sex_2010.html. In
fact, the variable definitions of adolescence and the failure of researchers to
collect data based on an exclusive definition of adolescence complicate
discussion of this population. See Jonathan Todres, Beyond the Bedside: A
Human Rights Approach to Adolescent Health, 20 J.L. & POL'Y 191 (2011).
1o It is important to note that adolescents are also incredibly diverse, with
large differences based on race, class and other characteristics.
" The Supreme Court, however, did appear to recognize the difference
between children and adolescents in the recent J.D.B. opinion. J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2407 (2011) (pointing out that a police
officer or judge need only have "the common sense to know that a 7-year-old
is not a 13-year-old [i.e. an adolescent] and neither is an adult").
12 New York, for instance, has a wide range of different minimum ages
for purchasing and drinking alcohol, voting, driving and obtaining
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The symposium "Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving
Legal Status," which took place in March 2011, focused on
three key areas: criminal law, health, and technology. We were
extremely fortunate to be able to bring together judges, lawyers,
scholars, and other experts to address questions including: How
has the status and role of adolescents changed recently, whether
through court decisions, legislation or other means of social
change?; What types of data or evidence, be it psychological,
statistical, or anecdotal, are courts and legislatures relying on to
craft protections and obligations for today's youth?; How should
young people be accorded increasing autonomy to allow them to
mature, while also being protected against harms to which they
are vulnerable?
JUVENILE JUSTICE
Michael Corriero, founder and director of the New York
Center for Juvenile Justice (NYCJJ) and former judge, kicked
off the symposium. Calling upon the audience to remember the
key differences between youth and adults, and the original
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court, Judge Corriero
called for a system which "judges children as children," while
contraception. See N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 1 (setting the voting age at
eighteen); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 2000) (prohibiting
the sale of alcohol to people under twenty-one); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2504 (McKinney 2002); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 502(2)(d)
(McKinney 1996) (allowing driving in some instances at age sixteen); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.6(a) (2011) (allowing minors sixteen
or older to access contraception without parental permission and allowing
facility staff to provide contraception to minors under sixteen years at their
discretion, encouraging consultation with a parent or guardian); see also
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MINORS' ACCESS TO
CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES (2011).
" Even the Supreme Court, while affirming the difference between
children and adults in J.D.B., acknowledged that some adolescents may be
closer to adults than to children and may therefore merit treatment more as
an adult than a child. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406 (acknowledging that a
young person's age will not be a major factor in some cases, and that an
older teenager will often react to a police interrogation in the same way as a
young adult or eighteen-year-old).
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still retaining the power to deal effectively with the few youth
who remain violent and dangerous. To illustrate his point, he
told the story of Qing Hong Wu. In 1996, Judge Corriero
sentenced a fifteen-year-old Wu for a string of robberies. The
Judge urged Wu to use his time in a juvenile facility to turn his
life around. 4 The young man did just that: he was a model
inmate and, upon his release, finished school and embarked on a
successful career in technology, supporting his immigrant
mother. Yet almost fifteen years later, Wu was about to be
deported to China based on his juvenile crime. Judge Corriero
successfully petitioned Governor Paterson to pardon Wu's
crimes so that he could stay in America. Despite this success,
Judge Corriero lamented the inflexibility of laws governing the
juvenile justice system that do not let most young people have a
second chance."
A panel of experts, including Tamar Birckhead, Mark
Fondacaro, Jeffrey Fagan, and Hillary Farber, then considered
other issues related to juvenile justice. They considered a central
ongoing debate-how society should address youth accused of
crimes. Should these crimes be adjudicated in a specialized
rehabilitative court for juveniles, or in the standard retributive
system with most of the due process protections accorded to
adults?" Those arguing for the former cite the special
characteristics and needs of youth and the harshness of the adult
system, regardless of due process protections.17 Those arguing
for the latter fear the potential for overreaching by even well-
meaning judges under a "rehabilitative" system, and point to the
" For a full description of this case, see Nina Bernstein, Judge Keeps
Word to Immigrant Who Kept His, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 2010, at Al.
" New York State's chief judge, Jonathan Lippman, recently called for a
raised age of criminal liability in the state, so that sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds would no longer be routinely tried as adults. See Mosi Secret,
Judge Seeks New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at A22.
" See Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0, 20 J.L. &
POL'Y 15 (2011) (for a concise yet informative outline of the original juvenile
court model).
" See, e.g., John Mahoney, DW's Cautionary Tale, 37 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 769, 775-76 (2011); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime,
FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008, at 15, 15.
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Supreme Court's recognition, in the seminal case of In re Gault,
of the need for due process." Regardless of which system we
select as the most fair and effective, questions remain about how
best to achieve structural change and influence the actions of all
of the players involved: police, youth, judges, parents and
lawyers. Finally, there are empirical and practical concerns to
consider. What interventions and programs have been shown to
work best to rehabilitate or otherwise address the complex
causes of youth delinquent and criminal behavior, and how
should we best allocate scarce resources?
Rather than simply weigh in on the retributive or
rehabilitative side of the debate, Professors Tamar Birckhead
and Mark Fondacaro forge new approaches to these complex
problems in their symposium pieces. In Juvenile Justice Reform
2.0, Professor Birckhead argues for a more nuanced approach to
institutional change.' 9 She illustrates how the seminal case of In
re Gault, which extended due process protections to juvenile
offenders, did not result in changes advocates had hoped for.
She posits that this is due to the lack of incentives for reform or
substantive external oversight of the insular juvenile court
world. As a result, many of the practices and policies of local
courts, officials, and state legislatures remained relatively intact,
and the forty years since Gault have seen an increase in the
punitive nature of sanctions accorded juveniles, high recidivism
rates, and disproportionate minority representation. Nonetheless,
Professor Birckhead is cautiously optimistic that the recent
decisions in Roper v. Simmons,20 Graham v. Florida,2 1 and
J.D.B. v. North Carolina may have a more profound impact on
8 See, e.g., Barry Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness,
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997) (for the view that the juvenile justice system should
adapt the process to the special needs and characteristics of the adolescent
population by allowing for their meaningful participation); see also Emily
Buss, Failing Juvenile Courts, and What Lawyers and Judges Can Do About
It, 6 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 318 (2011).
19 Birckhead, supra note 16.
20 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
" See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
22 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
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the juvenile justice system due to their narrow and specific
holdings and significant incentives to change the juvenile justice
system to reduce recidivism rates and increase fiscal savings.
These changes could range from the acknowledgment of youth
as a mitigating, rather than aggravating, factor to the increased
use of community-based rehabilitation programs. Yet Professor
Birckhead concludes that "constitutional litigation is an
unreliable path to social change" and it therefore must be
accompanied by work with community-based organizations that
include all the system's constituencies to achieve truly lasting
reform.
In The Injustice of Retribution: Toward a Multisystemic Risk
Management Model of Juvenile Justice, Professor Mark
Fondacaro also begins by acknowledging the failure of the
current system to address juvenile crime effectively or treat
juveniles fairly.23 As an alternative, Professor Fondacaro posits a
new model to deal with young offenders. Drawing on both
psychology and law, Professor Fondacaro proposes a forward-
looking, multisystemic model to understand and influence
juveniles' behavior.24 He argues that the traditional retributive
model of criminal justice draws upon antiquated and unsupported
"folk psychology" concepts of human behavior. In its stead,
Professor Fondacaro proposes a more pragmatic system that
would contextualize the young person, by involving his or her
parents, community, and service providers from multiple
disciplines, and empirically assess risk and protective factors
rather than adjudicate "moral" guilt. Such a system would rely
on evidence-based interventions to treat behaviors and reduce
recidivism. This model appears to be particularly suited to
adolescents given the recognition that they are more susceptible
than adults to outside influences, particularly their peers, and are
also more capable of rehabilitation. 25 Departing from a more due
23 Mark R. Fondacaro, The Injustice of Retribution: Toward a
Multisystemic Risk Management Model of Juvenile Justice, 20 J.L. & POL'Y
145 (2011).
24 See Professor Fondacaro's recent book, MARK FONDACARO &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE
JUSTICE, 63-121 (2011), for further discussion of this model.
25 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (drawing these conclusions about
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process-oriented model for youth, Professor Fondacaro cites the
lower level of process accorded juveniles2 6 as an opportunity to
test this more pragmatic and efficient, yet fair, administrative
justice approach.
The most frequent interaction that adolescents have with the
juvenile justice system is with the police. Two panelists
considered how police should and do interact with young people.
Professor Jeffrey Fagan offered initial findings of his empirical
research on police stops of young people in several high-crime
neighborhoods of New York City. He focused on random or
preventive stops, most of which did not result in the discovery
of criminal activity or in an arrest. During such encounters,
police often treat adolescents in a derogatory and even
discriminatory fashion. Adolescents are left with an arguably
justifiable distrust of, or hostility towards, the police and other
state actors, just as they are developing civic maturity. These
police practices persist, in part, because stops of young people
are rarely recorded and largely fall below the public "radar."27
The recent J.D.B. decision requires police officers to be
more proactive in offering Miranda warnings to youthful
suspects, since the court determined that age is a factor to be
considered in the analysis of whether or not someone is in police
custody.28 Yet the decision may have an even broader impact on
police interaction with juveniles. J.D.B. and its predecessor
cases, Graham and Simmons, may serve a signaling function that
the treatment of adolescents can no longer be covertly abusive,
and that interactions with them must take into account their
unique capabilities and vulnerabilities. In J.D.B. v. North
Carolina: Ushering in a New "Age" of Custody Analysis under
Miranda, Professor Hillary Farber considers the potential impact
of the J.D.B. decision on police interactions with young people,
young people).
1 For instance, juveniles accused of criminal behavior, unlike adults, are
not entitled to a jury trial.
27 Videotape: Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving Legal Status
(Brooklyn Law School 2011) (available at http://www.totalwebcasting.com/
view/?func= VIDI&id=bls&date= 2011-03-18&seq= 1&mt= 2&ext= 1)
[hereinafter Videotape: Adolescents in Society].
28 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011).
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including Terry stops, as well as on other instances where young
people interact with adults in the legal system, such as the
attorney-client relationship and any waiver of a juvenile's right
to counsel.2 9 While adolescents may distrust these authority
figures, they are nonetheless more deferential to them than are
other adults. Justice Kennedy noted this tendency in Graham v.
Florida, implying that this deference has consequences for due
process. Professor Farber concludes that the recognition of
adolescents as "categorically distinct from adults" in J.D.B. and
related cases could lead to meaningful due process for children,
according rights and protections commensurate with their
development. In this way, the spirit of Gault may be
"reinvigorate[d]."
TECHNOLOGY
The increasing interaction of young people with technology
raises numerous difficult questions. For instance, what policies
or legal tools should be used to address adolescents who "sext,"
(send sexually explicit messages or photographs via their cell
phones)? Should the sale of violent video games be banned or at
least require parental controls? Our experts on the technology
panel addressed these and other issues. Chris Hansen, Senior
National Counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union
discussed the First Amendment rights of adolescents, arguing
that the recent use of child pornography laws to criminally
prosecute minors for sexting is both ineffective policy and a
violation of the right to free speech. Professor John Humbach
from Pace Law School addressed a minor's First Amendment
right to access certain material. Addressing a case recently
before the Supreme Court, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association, Professor Humbach outlined some of the points for
and against curtailing young people's access to these materials.30
29 Hillary B. Farber, JDB v. North Carolina: Ushering In a New "Age"
of Custody Analysis Under Miranda, 20 J.L. & POL'Y 117 (2011).
30 The opinion came out after the symposium. See Brown v. Entm't
Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). The 5-4 majority struck down the
California statute at issue, which prohibited the sale or rental of violent video
games to minors.
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Amanda Lenhart, from the Pew Research Center's Internet and
American Life Project outlined some of the data on adolescents
and technology: Between nine and thirty-three percent of
adolescents aged ten to eighteen have been cyberbullied or
harassed online; four percent of teens owning cell phones have
sent a sexually suggestive photo or video of themselves to
someone else; and fifteen percent have received one." Although
we are still struggling to achieve the appropriate balance
between protection and autonomy for adolescents in this realm,
it is clear that we cannot ignore the increasingly important role
of technology in their lives.
HEALTH CARE
Whether and how to address the differences between adults
and adolescents has also long been debated in the health care
realm." Young people have historically been treated very
differently in the criminal justice and health arenas. In the
former, adolescents have often been held to adult levels of
responsibility. In contrast, adolescents have typically been
excluded from medical decision making beyond narrow
exceptions, such as reproductive health or substance abuse
treatment, or when their parents are denying them lifesaving
treatment.3 3 In such instances, "mature" minors may be allowed
to make decisions about their own bodies, whereas those
considered not yet mature will have their parents or other adults
34
appointed by the court to do so.
The recent recognition of the neurological and psychosocial
differences between adolescents and adults in the criminal
context raises questions about the determination of consent in the
health care arena as well. Panelists Jonathan Todres, Jennifer
Rosato, Jennifer Drobac, and Abigail English discussed whether
or not maturity means the same thing in various contexts, such
as the criminal versus health care arenas. The panelists also
31 Videotape: Adolescents in Society, supra note 27.
32 See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
31 See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 8, 173-179 (outlining cases).
34id.
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discussed how to define adolescent health. Is the current
framework overly focused on political hot topics, such as
minors' access to contraceptives and abortions, rather than also
incorporating other public health problems that impact many
young people, such as violence, nutrition and sexual
exploitation? In addition to discussing how the new science
should be incorporated into determinations of capacity, panelists
also considered what meaningful consent and participation in
medical decision making should entail for young people.
Drawing the proper balance between protection and autonomy is
particularly difficult in this field where the consequences of bad
choices can be so detrimental.
Since our discussions about adolescent health tend to
myopically focus on abortion and other reproductive health
issues, in Beyond the Bedside: A Human Rights Approach to
Adolescent Health, Professor Jonathan Todres seeks to expand
the dialogue by addressing other key issues which have a great
impact on adolescents' health: violence, substance use and
obesity. Professor Todres outlines the harms resulting from
these health problems, which continue from adolescence into
adulthood." For instance, over half of urban adolescents have
witnessed or been victimized by violence; three quarters of
adolescents have tried alcohol and about half have smoked
cigarettes; and eighteen percent of American adolescents are
obese, with many more overweight. These "systemic
community" public health issues, Professor Todres argues, are
best addressed through a human rights framework. Such an
approach looks at adolescents and their communities holistically.
It also gives a voice to the youth themselves, by incorporating
their participation at every stage of health care assessment and
delivery.
Two experts address the thorny dilemma of adolescent
capacity and consent: When is a young person adequately
mature to consent to medical treatment or sexual activity? Who
should determine such maturity and how? In What are the
Implications of Roper's Dilemma for Adolescent Health Law?,
Dean Jennifer Rosato considers how recent scientific findings
" Todres, supra note 9.
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illustrating the differences between adolescents and adults,
findings the Supreme Court has found persuasive, will affect
health care decision making. Dean Rosato admits to being "a bit
troubled" by Roper, Graham, and other recent decisions finding
juveniles less culpable in criminal matters, since the same logic
may be applied to deny young people a voice and consent
powers in health matters.36 She is also sensitive to the
accusation, made by Justice Scalia in the Roper dissent, that
children's advocates seem to want to have it both ways: young
people are sufficiently mature for decision making responsibility
about their bodies, but not for accountability for their criminal
behavior. Concluding that there is no tidy solution to "Roper's
Dilemma," Dean Rosato nonetheless argues that decision making
capacity is highly contextual, and thus some minors should be
permitted to make some health care decisions. The maturity
determination should be individualized and cannot be based upon
science alone. That is, medical professionals, rather than courts,
should assess a particular adolescent's maturity in most cases,
taking into account policy goals and context as well as empirical
research.
Considering consent in the context of sexual interactions,
Professor Jennifer Drobac also grapples with the definition of
maturity, and how recent neuroscience and psychosocial
advances in this field should impact legal determinations of
consent. In A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science,
Teenagers, and the Sting to "the Age of Consent, " she points out
the inconsistency between formulations of adolescent capacity in
criminal and civil law even for the same acts: an adult who
engages in sexual activity with a minor is criminally liable under
statutory rape laws but may be able to defend against the young
woman's claim in a civil case because she "consented" to the
sexual act." Consent is contextual. Accordingly, Professor
36 Rosato, supra note 8.
37 Drobac, supra note 6, at 95-98 (discussing Doe v. Starbucks, No.
SACV 08-0582 AG (CWx), 2009 WL 5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009);
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 824 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Table), 2006 WL 240532 (2006)
and other cases suggesting that statutory rape laws and other criminal
formulations of consent may not be applicable in the civil context). A similar
paradox exists between statutory rape laws and criminal laws punishing
12
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Drobac does not advocate for one age of consent in all cases.
She also does not support a bright-line rule of age eighteen for
the civil context, because recent neuroscience indicates that most
adolescents are still not reliably able to make mature decisions at
that age and because it also denies adolescents who mature more
quickly the benefit of engaging in decision making. Instead, she
proposes "legal assent," which requires no threshold level of
legal capacity and is legally binding on the minor, unless he or
she chooses to void it subsequently. It is voidable if in the
minor's best interest. This consent framework thus both helps
the minor mature and develop, and allows for the "second
chances" so essential to still developing young people.
CONCLUSION
The lively discussion among the panelists and authors at the
symposium suggests several conclusions. First, the old dualities
of consent versus incapacity, and retribution versus
rehabilitation, do not provide an effective framework for
assessing the status and role of adolescents today. Instead, we
need to look for a more nuanced middle ground, which assesses
the needs and abilities of youth in various contexts. Second, the
determination of maturity is a complex process, which should
take into account, but not rely exclusively on, scientific
developments informing us about neurological and psychosocial
capacity. Maturity determinations must also take into account
cultural norms, the context of the right or responsibility at issue,
and the actors involved in the determination. Third, the law
continues to grapple with the key question of how to weigh
adolescents' need for increasing autonomy and maturation
experiences with their vulnerability to adult exploitation and
other harms.
minors for prostitution and related offenses. See Cynthia Godsoe, Finally
There's a Safe Harbor, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 2008, at 26. In recent years, a
number of states have attempted to rectify this disjunction in the law's
consideration of adolescents by decriminalizing juveniles charged with
prostitution. See, e.g., New York Safe Harbor for Exploited Children Act
N.Y. Soc. SERV.. LAW § 447-b (McKinney 2010).
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The next few years will be an exciting time for scholars in
this field, as the recent line of Supreme Court cases recognizing
differences between adolescents and adults plays out in the lower
courts, legislatures, and fields beyond criminal justice. New
neurological and psychological research will also undoubtedly
provide us with more, possibly conflicting, information about
adolescent development. The only certainty is that adolescence
will remain a period of great change and some turbulence,
bridging childhood and adulthood.
